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Experiments showed that ten-year old children are able to create algorithms, i.e., sequences of 
operations that solve problems, and that their gestures help them to do so.  The theory of mental 
models, which is implemented in a computer program, postulates that the creation of algorithms 
depends on kinematic mental simulations.  Gestures are outward signs of moves and they help the 
process.  We tested ten-year children, because they can make mental simulations, and because they 
gesture more than adults.  They readily rearranged the order of six cars in a train (using a siding), 
and the difficulty of the task depended on the number of moves in minimal solutions (Experiment 
1).  They were also able to devise informal algorithms to rearrange the order of cars when they were 
not allowed to move the cars, and the difficulty of the task depended on the complexity of the 
algorithms (Experiment 2).  When children were unable to gesture as they formulated algorithms, 
the accuracy of their algorithms declined by13% (Experiment 3).   We discuss the implications of 
these results for accounts of reasoning and theories of gestures. 
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Our research concerns the creation of informal algorithms.  They are descriptions of a 
sequence of steps that transforms an input into an output, so they can solve problems.  Formal 
algorithms are embodied in computer programs, but informal algorithms are the substance of much of 
human reasoning.  People describe them for daily activities such as setting a table, repairing a bicycle, 
and driving directions to a destination.  They are explanations of how to carry out a particular process 
that solves a problem, though not all explanations are algorithms.  For example, an explanation can 
describe why something happened, such as the flooding of New Orleans during hurricane Katrina.  
The ability to devise informal algorithms is crucial for computer programming, and adults who are 
not programmers are able to devise them (Khemlani, Mackiewicz, Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird, 
2013).   It seems reasonable to suppose that the ability has its roots in childhood, but prior to our 
research no-one knew whether children were able to devise informal algorithms.  Our first goal was 
accordingly to find out. 
Our first issue was to determine a general domain suitable for studying algorithms. 
Psychologists have studied many sorts of problem, such as the well-known X-ray problem, the Tower 
of Hanoi, Sudoku puzzles, and so on and on.  Many of these problems are in reality just a single 
problem, e.g., the X-ray puzzle, which is to devise a set up in which powerful X-rays can kill a tumor 
without damaging the healthy surrounding tissue (Duncker, 1945).  Others are slightly more general, 
though a single algorithm can in principle solve all instances of them, e.g., Tower problems (Aamodt-
Leeper, Creswell, McGurk, & Skuse, 2001; Huizenga, Dolan, & van der Molen, 2006; Luciana & 
Nelson, 1998; Shallice, 1982).  Studies of tower problems showed that working memory is needed to 
hold and to update information (Miyake et al., 2000; Unterrainer & Owen, 2006), that the capacity of 
working memory does not reach adult levels until late adolescence (Luna et al., 2004), and that it 
continues to develop into early adulthood (Albert & Steinberg, 2011).  We needed a domain in which 
there was a plentiful supply of problems, which each called for a different algorithm, and for which 
we could manipulate the complexity of the algorithms.   Rearrangement of cars on a toy railway track 
was promising, because children could understand the domain.  Figure 1 shows the track at the start 
of a problem. It has labeled cars arranged on the left track, and a picture of the required goal, i.e., the 
required rearrangement of the cars on the right track.  The task is to rearrange the cars, using the 
siding as necessary, so that they are lined up in the required order on the right track.  Only three sorts 
of move are allowed: cars can be moved from the left to the right track, from the left track to the 
siding, and from the siding to the left track. Hence, various moves are not allowed, including a move 
from the siding directly to the right track, a move from the right track back to the left track, or a move 
that lifts one car over another.  The participants can move several cars at once: they hold one car, and 
then push it and any cars in front of it to their new position on the track. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The domain has two essential properties for the study of algorithms.  First, there are many 
different sorts of rearrangement – in theory an infinite number.  For example, the order of the cars 
in a train can be reversed, so that the order abcdef becomes fedcba, or they can be interleaved in a 
parity sort so that all the cars in odd numbered positions precede those in even numbered positions, 
e.g., the order abcdef becomes acebdf.  Readers familiar with Turing machines (Hopcroft & 
Ullman, 1979) will notice the similarity of the railway domain to them.  With the ability to scan the 
contents of cars (e.g., binary digits), and to add or remove these contents, the railway system has the 
power of a Universal Turing machine, because both the siding and the left track can function to 
store information (Hopcroft & Ullman, 1979). It is therefore possible to emulate the process of 
solving the Tower of Hanoi in the railway environment.  However, our studies examined only 
simple rearrangements, such as reversals and parity sorts. 
Second, there is a crucial difference between making a rearrangement and creating an 
algorithm to make it, and the railway environment offers the possibility to investigate both abilities. 
Making a rearrangement is like assembling a piece of furniture given the parts and a diagram 
representing the finished result: the assembler moves the parts into the positions shown in the 
diagram.  In contrast, devising an algorithm is like telling the assembler what to do, which as a 
result will yield the finished piece of furniture: the programmer can see the diagram but can’t refer 
to it in the instructions to the assembler, because the assembler can’t see the diagram.  The contrast 
is clear in the instructions for the two sorts of task. 
The key instruction for making a rearrangement is: “In this game, you have to form a train 
on the right track in the order shown in the photograph behind the track, and you can make the three 
sorts of move.”  The participants use the picture of the goal to decide which cars to move and where 
to move them.  They can use a means to partial-ends strategy. That is, they can decompose the ends  
– the required order of the cars on the right track – in order to achieve them in a piecemeal way, one 
or more adjacent cars at a time (cf. Newell & Simon, 1972). The following procedure, for example, 
is a simple way to do make any rearrangement:- 
  1) Find the positions of the car(s) on the left-track that are furthest to the right in the goal;  
  2) If cars are in front of these cars then move the blocking cars to the siding.   
  3) Move the target car(s) to the right track.  
  4) Return the cars on the siding, if any, to the left track.  
  5) Repeat from step 1 until the left track is empty. 
The procedure makes rearrangements, but it fails to do so in a minimal number of moves, tending to 
move cars off the siding unnecessarily.  We describe a more efficient algorithm presently. 
 In contrast, the key instruction for devising an algorithm is: “You have to describe the 
moves needed to yield a train in the required order on the right track, but you are not allowed to 
move the cars.”  For example, an algorithm to reverse the order of cars is: 
1) Move all but one car on the left track to the siding. 
2) While there are cars on the siding, move one car from the left track to the right track, and move 
one car from the siding to the left track.  
3) When there are no cars on the siding, move one car from the left track to the right track. 
Step 2 in the algorithm calls for a loop of operations until all the cars have been shifted from the 
siding.  We use diagrams, such as: 
  a[bcdef] - 
to represent the current state of the track, where in this case car a is on the left track, cars bcdef are on 
the siding, which the square brackets demarcate, and “-” shows that the right track is empty.  The 
algorithm above yields the following sequence of moves: 
 abcdef[-] -, a[bcdef] -, - [bcdef]a, b[cdef]a, [cdef]ba … and so on until - [-]fedcba. 
Each sort of rearrangement requires its own algorithm.   
 The creation of an algorithm is neither a deduction from observations nor a mere inductive 
generalization from them, though it may rely on both.  Following Peirce (1955, Ch. 11) we use the 
term abduction to refer to the special sort of induction that underlies the creation of plans, 
explanations, and algorithms.  The abduction of an algorithm according to the theory of mental 
models, which is described in detail in the next section, depends on a kinematic simulation, that is, a 
mental model that unfolds in time in the same temporal order as a sequence of events (e.g., Hegarty, 
1992; Johnson-Laird, 1983).  The simulation has to be translated into a verbal description of the 
algorithm. 
The two tasks of making a rearrangement problem and of formulating an algorithm to make 
it should differ in difficulty.  The difficulty of making a rearrangement should depend on the 
minimal numbers of moves and of cars to be moved that it requires – just as, for example, the 
difficulty of a tower problem depends on the number of disks to be rearranged.   If the minimal 
numbers of moves and cars to be moved increases over a set of different rearrangements, then the 
difficulty of making them should increase too.   In contrast, the difficulty of formulating an 
algorithm should depend on the complexity of the algorithm rather than on the number of moves that 
its execution calls for.  As complexity increases over a set of algorithms, so too should the difficulty 
of formulating them.  We return to these two points later in order to flesh out the predictions for our 
experiments.  Evidence corroborates the difference between the two tasks in a study of adults who 
made rearrangements, and who formulated algorithms to make them (Khemlani et al., 2013).  The 
evidence was the actual numbers of moves that the participants took to make rearrangements and the 
accuracy of their algorithms.  But, could there be more direct evidence for the use of mental 
simulations? 
According to the model theory, individuals’ gestures as they try to formulate algorithms provide 
an outward sign of an inward simulation.  When they are not allowed to move the cars in our studies, 
they have to imagine moving them.  And this mental simulation controls gestures, showing the 
movements of cars.  But, gestures should also improve the accuracy of the algorithms that children 
formulate.  This effect should occur for two reasons (cf. Hostetter & Alibali, 2008, 2010; Marghetis & 
Benjamin, 2014).  First, when children use a deictic gesture to point to a car and then an iconic gesture 
to show its movement from one position to another, they have no need to name the car or to describe its 
movement in their description of the algorithm.  This reduced demand on verbal processes allows them 
to focus more on the formulation of the algorithm.  Second, although gestures are under the control of 
mental simulation, the very act of pointing and gesturing should help children to keep track of a 
simulation, and to maintain a correct model in working memory of what cars are where at the current 
juncture of the algorithm.  Hence, gestures should have a causal effect: they should make it easier to 
formulate accurate algorithms.   Gestures are on this account both an output from and an input to 
kinematic simulations.  The results of previous studies in domains different from the formulation of 
algorithms are consistent with this account: during descriptions of spatial relations, iconic gestures 
reduce the need to describe referents (Chu & Kita, 2011; Sauter, Uttal, Alman, Goldin-Meadow, & 
Levine, 2012), and they help speakers to maintain information in memory (see, e.g., Morsella & 
Krauss, 2004; Wesp, Hess, Keutmann, & Wheaton, 2001). Studies have likewise shown that deictic 
gestures can improve memory for their referents (Petkov & Nikolova, 2010).  Their effects should 
therefore be important when individuals are trying to create an algorithm but are not allowed to move 
the cars, because their gestures help them to envisage what is going on, and to finesse the description of 
moves.   It follows that the task of formulating an algorithm should be more difficult – more prone to 
error, and take longer – if the participants are unable to gesture.  The second aim of our research was to 
test this prediction, and to examine the effects of deictic and iconic gestures on descriptions. 
Three main hypotheses exist about the relation between gestures and thinking.  The first is that 
gestures are epiphenomena: they are consequences of thinking but play no causal role in the process 
(e.g., Kita & Ozyurek, 2003; Melinger & Kita, 2007).  Speakers on mobile phones, for example, often 
gesture as they talk, though for no apparent reason.  The second hypothesis is that gestures are 
communicative (e.g., Hostetter, 2011).  Conventional gestures such as those used in Naples, or well-
known obscene signs, are intentional communications (McNeill, 1992), but the hypothesis allows that 
gestures can also be tacit communications that individuals generate unconsciously as they speak. The 
third hypothesis is that gestures not only reflect thinking, but also affect it and can improve it (e.g., 
Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly, & Wagner, 2001; Wagner, Nusbaum, & Goldin-Meadow, 2004).  
Evidence corroborates the hypothesis.  Studies have compared performance when participants are able 
to gesture with performance when they are not able to gesture.  They show that gesturing improves 
performance in learning math (e.g., Goldin-Meadow, Cook, & Mitchell, 2009), in mental rotation tasks 
(e.g., Chu & Kita, 2011), in spatial reasoning (Ehrlich, Levine, & Goldin-Meadow, 2006), in simulating 
a system of gears (Alibali, Spencer, Knox, & Kita, 2011), in learning science from texts (e.g., Cutica, 
Ianì, & Bucciarelli, 2014), and in the production of discourse (e.g., Alibali & Kita, 2010). As the model 
theory implies, gestures can be outward signs of mental simulations (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008; 2010) 
and a natural way of expressing their results (Hegarty, Mayer, Kriz, & Keehner, 2005). 
Of course, the three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive.  Some gestures may be 
epiphenomena, but the model theory postulates that gestures can both help speakers to communicate 
(by allowing them not to have to describe moves in rearrangement), and assist the process of thinking 
(by providing an aid to remembering where various cars are located on the railway).  
An ideal population for our studies seemed to be ten-year-old children.  They have the ability to 
plan (Keen, 2011), to carry out means–ends analyses (Kuhn, 2013), to make the rearrangement in the 
Tower of Hanoi problem (e.g., Aamodt-Leeper, et al., 2001), and to make mental simulations of actions 
(Skoura, Vinter, & Papaxanthis, 2009).  Hence, they should be able to cope with the rearrangements of 
trains.  However, their working memories are not fully developed (e.g., Cowan, 2005; Unterrainer & 
Owen, 2006), and do not reach adult capacity until late adolescence or beyond (Albert & Steinberg, 
2011; Welsh, Pennington, & Grossier, 1991).  It is this capacity that predicts their performance in 
inferential tasks (Barrouillet, Grosset, & Lecas, 2000).  Moreover, they tend to make more gestures than 
adults even as their speech develops (e.g., Alibali, Evans, et al., 2009; Chu & Kita, 2008; Colletta et al., 
2015).  We accordingly investigated children of around the age of ten years.  
At the start of our investigation, we did not know whether ten-year-old children could formulate 
algorithms, whether their gestures would reflect mental simulations, or whether their gestures would 
help them to formulate more accurate algorithms. Our research accordingly focused on these questions.  
In what follows, we outline the model theory of mental simulation and its computer implementation, 
and the theory’s predictions about making different sorts of rearrangement and its different predictions 
for abducing algorithms to make them. We then describe three experiments designed to test these 
predictions.  Experiment 1 established that ten-year-olds were able to make re-arrangements and that 
the minimal number of moves in making them predicted their difficulty. Experiment 2 presented ten-
year-olds with the different task of creating algorithms for different rearrangements.   The difficulty of 
the task depended, not on the number of moves in a rearrangement, but on the complexity of the 
algorithm.  Experiment 3 showed that ten year-olds formulated algorithms more accurately when they 
could gesture than when they could not gesture.  Finally, we discuss the implications of the results. 
 
THE MODEL THEORY 
Mental simulations 
The idea of a mental simulation depends on three assumptions formulated in the model 
theory (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Khemlani, 2013; Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, & Goodwin, 2015).  
First, mental models are iconic, that is, the structure of a model corresponds to the structure of what 
it represents insofar as possible (see, e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2006; Peirce, 1931-1958, Vol. 4).  For 
example, the spatial relations among objects in a situation are mirrored in the spatial relations 
among them in their model. Second, mental models underlie visual images, but they are more 
parsimonious (Shepard & Metzler, 1971), because they do not represent a situation from a particular 
point of view or represent all, or any, of its visual features (Hegarty, Stieff, & Dixon, 2013). Models 
can represent what is common to many possibilities, which differ in their details, and so they yield 
faster inferences than images (Knauff, Fangmeier, Ruff, & Johnson-Laird, 2003).  Third, a 
simulation depends on a kinematic sequence in a mental model that changes over time.  The 
sequence itself represents the temporal order of the events (Johnson-Laird, 1983, Ch. 15; Khemlani 
et al., 2013). 
 The capacity of working memory constrains simulations, which cannot animate all the parts 
of a moving machine simultaneously – notwithstanding anecdotal reports to the contrary, e.g., 
Nikola Tesla was said to be able to envisage running a dynamo in order to see which bearings 
would wear out first.  However, as Hegarty (1992, 2004) has shown, naive individuals cannot 
simulate all the actions of a system of pulleys at the same time. Instead, they propagate the effects 
of one pulley in the system to the next, and so on, in a piecemeal simulation.  Fortunately, in the 
mental simulations underlying the rearrangements in our tasks, individuals need to envisage only 
one move at a time. 
The mAbducer program 
The model theory explains how people make rearrangements, how they abduce algorithms 
to make them, and how they deduce the consequences of such algorithms.  We have implemented 
its account of these three processes in a computer program, mAbducer. The program is written in 
Common Lisp, and its source code is available at: http://mentalmodels.princeton.edu/models/. 
 In order to make a rearrangement, mAbducer uses a single general algorithm in the form of a 
loop: 
   1) If no cars remain to be moved in order to achieve the goal, then the rearrangement is done. 
   2) If there are more cars that match the goal at the head of the train on the left track than on the  
     siding, then move the matching cars to the right track.  
3) Otherwise if the left track has the next car(s) in the goal but there are cars blocking their 
    move, then move the blocking cars to the siding. 
4) Otherwise for the next car(s) in the goal, move them and any cars in front of them from the  
     siding to the left track. 
Unlike the algorithm outlined in the Introduction, this one makes the rearrangements in our experiments 
in a minimal number of moves.  For the problems in the present studies, an exhaustive search 
corroborated this claim.   Two statistics should predict the difficulty of making a rearrangement: the 
minimal number of moves in the rearrangement, and the minimal number of cars to be moved. A 
reversal of six cars calls for 12 moves, and all but one of the cars moves more than once, yielding a 
minimal total of 16 cars in moves.  These two variables had effects in predicting adults’ difficulty in 
making rearrangements, both for the actual numbers of moves they made and the times they took, but 
the two variables did not interact (Khemlani et al., 2013).    
  Our experiments examined four sorts of rearrangement, which Table 1 presents with their 
minimal numbers of moves and minimal numbers of cars to be moved.  Appendix A summarizes the 
derivations of these numbers.  The two measures yield the following predicted trend in increasing 
difficulty for making rearrangements: 
 Palindrome  < parity sort < reverse parity sort < reversal. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
  The difficulty of creating an algorithm for rearrangements should depend, not on the numbers of 
moves and cars to be moved, but on the complexity of the sequence of moves in the algorithm.  The 
mAbducer program abduces algorithms that make rearrangements.  It does so by simulating the 
rearrangements, abstracting from these simulations their underlying structure, and then translating this 
structure into LISP, a formal programming language, and into informal English. The algorithms are 
general, yielding a correct performance of a rearrangement for trains containing any number of cars. 
We present here mAbducer’s informal algorithms verbatim for the four rearrangements in our studies.   
We present them using the diagrams that we described earlier, and that mAbducer also uses: 
1. Reversal: abcdef[-] - is to be rearranged as: - [-]fedcba, where “-” denotes an empty part of the 
track: 
Move one less than the cars to the siding. 
While there are more than zero cars on the siding, 
       move one car to right track,   [Printer, please indent this line as shown] 
       move one car to left track.      [Printer, please indent this line as shown] 
Move one car to right track. 
The sequence for the reversal of a six-car train has four repetitions of a loop of two moves, and so 
its structure is simple and salient.   
2. Palindrome: abccba[-] - is to be rearranged as:  - [-]aabbcc. 
Move one less than half the cars to the siding. 
While there are more than two cars on left track, 
       move two cars to right track, [Printer, please indent this line as shown] 
       move one car to left track. [Printer, please indent this line as shown] 
  Move two cars to right track. 
The palindrome has only two repetitions of a two-move loop, and one of the moves in the loop is of 
two cars.  So, the algorithm is slightly more complex than the one for the reversal. 
3. Parity sort: abcdef[-] - is to be rearranged as:  - [-]acebdf.  
  While there are more than two cars on left track, 
       move one car to right track, [Printer, please indent this line as shown] 
       move one car to the siding. [Printer, please indent this line as shown] 
  Move one car to right track. 
  Move one less than half the cars to left track. 
  Move half the cars to right track. 
The parity sort has two repetitions of a two-move loop, but they are followed by a sequence of three 
moves. Hence, the algorithm is more complex than the one for the palindrome. 
4. Reverse parity sort: acebdf[-] - is to be rearranged as: - [-]abcdef.    
Set the number of cars to be dynamically moved, n-of-s, to one less than half the cars. 
Set the decrement to one. 
  While n-of-s is more than zero, 
   move one car to right track,  [Printer, please indent this line as shown] 
  move n-of-s cars to the siding, [Printer, please indent this line as shown] 
 move one car to right track,   [Printer, please indent this line as shown] 
move n-of-s cars to left track, [Printer, please indent this line as shown] 
take decrement from n-of-s.  [Printer, please indent this line as shown] 
  Move two cars to right track. 
The algorithm has two repetitions of a loop, but individuals are most unlikely to detect the loop, 
because it contains four moves.  This factor and the use of the variables n-of-s and decrement imply 
that this algorithm should be the most complex of the four. 
The preceding analysis of complexity is intuitive but sensible.  It can be assessed in many 
other ways, including the number of instructions and the number of their operands in each 
algorithm.  They corroborate the intuitive trend too.  It is also borne out by a simple universal 
metric that has been used in psychological studies (e.g., Chater & Vitányi, 2003; Khemlani et al., 
2013): Kolmogorov complexity.  This measure assesses the complexity of a string of symbols from 
the length of its shortest possible description in a reference language, such as Common Lisp. We 
computed Kolmogorov complexity from the numbers of characters in mAbducer’s Common Lisp 
algorithms, multiplied by the number of bits in a character.  This measure predicts the same trend in 
increasing difficulty as the intuitive account above, which we show here with their Kolmogorov 
complexities: 
    reversal (1288) < palindrome (1295) < parity sort (1519)  < reverse parity sort (1771). 
We refer simply to the “complexity” of an algorithm, whichever way it is assessed, and it should 
predict the difficulty of formulating algorithms. 
The difference between the trend predictions for making and for programming 
rearrangements concerns only reversals. They should be the hardest rearrangements to make, but 
the easiest to program.  In our studies, the two tasks differed in several ways.  First, the children 
moved the cars in making rearrangements, whereas they were not allowed to move them in 
formulating algorithms.  Second, the children did not have to describe anything as they made a 
rearrangement, whereas they had to describe the algorithms that they abduced.  A corollary is that 
making rearrangements should be much easier than formulating algorithms. The contrast between 
the two tasks was even more marked for adults when they had to formulate algorithms that worked 
for trains of any length.  In such cases, an algorithm must depend on a loop of moves, and 
mAbducer can formulate loops that are carried out for a specified number of times, and loops that 
are carried out while a given condition obtains.  While-loops are computationally more powerful 
than for-loops, i.e., they can compute functions that for-loops cannot compute (see, e.g., Johnson-
Laird, 1983, Ch. 1; Rogers, 1967), but they are a natural by-product of mental simulations, and 
adults used them more often than for-loops in devising informal algorithms (Khemlani et al., 2013).  
Each algorithm in the present studies was for a train of only six cars, and so children were most 
unlikely to invoke explicit loops of operations – adults seldom did for trains with only a small 
number of cars (Khemlani et al., 2013), but, as we now explain, the children’s algorithms should 
contain precursors to loops. 
When a repeated sequence of moves is highly salient, children should tend to abbreviate the 
description of these moves in what we refer to as a “proto-loop”, because such descriptions are 
precursors to proper loops. Hence, a proto-loop should occur when a child realizes that the same 
operations can be carried out on new cars, and abbreviates the description of these moves. For 
example, a child might describe moving car d from the siding to the left track and then to the right 
track, and continue the description, “and then do the same for e and then f”.  This description is an 
abbreviation, because the reference of “do the same” depends on context, and it is a proto-loop 
because it refers to carrying out the same sequence of operations on each member of set of cars. A 
further prediction is that the occurrence of proto-loops should be inversely related to the complexity 
of algorithms. For example, proto-loops should be more likely in an algorithm for a reversal, which 
repeats a pair of moves four times, than for a reverse parity sort, which has just two repeats of four 
moves, which should therefore be much harder to detect. 
The five predictions 
In summary, the model theory makes five main predictions:-  
1.  The difficulty of making a rearrangement should depend on the minimal numbers of moves and 
cars to be moved.  These two factors yield a trend of increasing difficulty over the four 
rearrangements in our studies: 
palindrome < parity sort  < reverse parity sort < reversal.  
2. The difficulty of formulating an algorithm should depend on its complexity.  This prediction 
yields a trend of increasing difficulty over the four sorts of rearrangement: 
 reversal < palindrome < parity sort < reverse parity sort. 
3. Children’s tendency to use proto-loops should correlate inversely with the complexity of the 
algorithms.  
4. Children should spontaneously use gestures that mimic moves as they try to formulate 
algorithms, because gestures should reduce the descriptive demands of the task and help them to 
remember the current positions of the cars on the track. 
5. Gestures should help children to formulate accurate algorithms, i.e., they should perform better 
when they can gesture than when they can’t gesture. 
We now turn to the experiments designed to test these predictions. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Our first task was to determine whether ten-year-olds were able to make the four sorts of 
rearrangement of six cars.  If they weren’t able to do so, it would be pointless to ask them to 
formulate algorithms for making them.  So, the aim of the first experiment was to examine 
children’s ability to make rearrangements and to test whether their performance corroborated the 
model theory, that is, the difficulty of a rearrangement should yield the predicted trend (1).  We 
assessed the children’s difficulty in making rearrangements from the actual numbers of moves that 
they took to make them. 
Participants  
We tested twenty fifth-grade children (age M = 9;7 years, ranging from 8;2 to 10;10 years; 
10 M and 10 F) from a primary school in Turin, Italy. As in all our experiments, they took part 
voluntarily, after their parents had given their informed consent. 
Design  
The participants acted as their own controls and carried out the four rearrangements shown 
in Table 1 above: a palindrome, a parity sort, a reverse parity sort, and a reversal. They differed in 
theoretical difficulty according to the minimal numbers of moves and cars to be moved (as 
corroborated by mAbducer).  To assess the children’s performance of the four sorts of 
rearrangement, we recorded the accuracy of their solutions, the actual numbers of moves in their 
solutions, and their mean latencies.  The rearrangements were presented in a different random order 
to each participant. 
Procedure 
The children were tested individually in a quiet room and in the sole presence of the 
experimenter. The materials were the railway track and six cars of different colors (blue, green, 
beige, red, violet and yellow), labeled with different letters (a, b, c, d, e, f, respectively), and a 
photograph of the required rearrangement behind the right track. 
 The instructions explained the general nature of the task: the children had to use the siding 
to rearrange the cars so that they ended up on right track in the order shown in the photograph. The 
experimenter pointed to each relevant part of the track, and demonstrated the rules, as she read the 
following key instructions (translated from Italian): 
“This is a game on how we can form trains. In order to form a train you can make moves using 
these tracks: the left track, the right track, and the siding. These are the six cars to use to form 
trains. At the beginning, the cars are on the left track. The train you construct has to be on the 
right track. In order to remember this, each time I’ll put a photo of the train you have to construct 
behind the right side of the track. In order to form the trains you have to follow some rules: 
• You can’t lift the cars: they have to run on the tracks. 
• You can’t move the cars from the right track to the left track. You can move cars from the left 
track either to the right track or to the siding, and from the siding back to the left track. 
• You have to try to construct a train in the fewest moves. In order to do so, when you have to 
move more than one car on a track, move them all together. If, for instance, you want to move 
two cars from the left track to the siding, you should move the two cars together in a single move 
rather than in two separate moves.” 
The experimenter then asked the child to do a practice rearrangement in which two black cars had 
to be moved from left to right track. 
On each trial, the experimenter first placed the six cars on the left track, next she put the 
photo of the goal state behind the right track, and then she invited the child to start to construct the 
train.  The experimental session was video-recorded, and transcribed to show the children’s moves, 
using the same diagrams as mAbducer’s, and to record their overall times from the presentation of a 
goal to the end of the child’s final move. 
Results and discussion 
Insert Table 2 about here 
All 20 participants were accurate with the palindrome, parity sort, and reverse parity sort, 
and 19 of them were accurate with the reversal.  The overall mean time to make the rearrangements 
was 54 s. Table 2 summarizes the participants’ accuracy, mean number of moves, and the latencies 
of their correct solutions.  The theoretical minimal numbers of moves (and number of cars to be 
moved) predicted the difficulty of the rearrangements, both the children’s actual numbers of moves 
over the four rearrangements (Page’s L = 581,5, z = 6.31, p < .00001), and the times they took to 
make correct solutions (Page’s L = 544, z = 3.41, p < .0003).  The prediction concerns stochastic 
trends, and so we used Page’s L test to assess the reliability of such an increase in the rank order of 
the number of moves, and of their latencies, over the four arrangements. 
The children seldom succeeded in making minimal rearrangements, especially for the 
reversal.  Nineteen out of the twenty participants made at least one redundant move on three or 
more of the rearrangements, i.e., more often than chance (Binomial test, p < .000025).  The 
redundancies occurred mainly because children made a move they immediately reversed, or 
because they perseverated.  For example, a child moved a car from the siding to the left track, and 
then over to the right track, failing to notice that a more parsimonious solution was to move two 
cars together from the left track to the right track.   The participants differed reliably one from 
another, not in the accuracy with which they made the rearrangements (Friedman non-parametric 
analysis of variance, χ2 = 3.00, df = 3, p > .3), but in the times that they took to make them (the 
fastest child had a mean time of 32 s, and the slowest child had a mean time of 81 s; Friedman non-
parametric analysis of variance, χ2 = 17.37, df = 3, p < .001).  The ages of the participants expressed 
in months correlated neither with accuracy (Spearman’s ρ = .12, p > .61), nor with mean times 
(Spearman’s ρ = .21, p > .35).  Likewise, gender did not reliably affect either accuracy (98% and 
100% for males and females, respectively; Mann-Whitney test, z = 1.0, p > .32, Cliff’s δ = .03) or 
mean times (51 s and 58 s for males and females, respectively; Mann-Whitney test, z = .51, p = .61, 
Cliff’s δ = .07). In sum, ten-year-olds could make the rearrangements, and their accuracy and 
latency corroborated the model theory’s predicted trend (prediction 1 above), but they differed in 
the speed with which they made the rearrangements.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
We devised Experiment 2 to find out whether children were able to abduce informal 
algorithms for making the four sorts of rearrangement.  Adults who knew nothing about 
programming could formulate accurate algorithms (Khemlani et al., 2013), but no studies had been 
carried out on children.  When they made rearrangements in Experiment 1, the goal in the picture 
behind the right track governed their choice of moves. They could use a single strategy to make any 
rearrangement, because they could decompose the goal  – the required order of the cars on right 
track – and rearrange one or more adjacent cars at a time until they were in the order that matched 
the goal. In contrast, when they had to formulate an algorithm to make a particular rearrangement, 
the algorithm itself cannot rely on the goal. In effect, the algorithm has to specify the moves from 
the initial configuration that will yield the goal.  The children can look at the goal, but their task is 
to describe a sequence of moves that make no reference to the goal but that produce it as an output. 
 Hence, each rearrangement calls for its own algorithm (see the four algorithms described in the 
section above on the model theory). The formulation of algorithms should therefore be more 
complicated than merely making rearrangements. Likewise, the children had to formulate these 
algorithms without being able to move the actual cars, and so abduction required them to keep in 
mind the current positions of all six cars. 
The experiment tested three predictions.  First, the complexity of the algorithms, as opposed 
to their minimal numbers of moves and cars to be moved, should predict the following trend of 
increasing difficulty of abducing them (prediction 2 in the summary of predictions above):  
reversal < palindrome < parity sort < reverse parity sort. 
The crucial difference between complexity and number of moves concerns the reversal.  In 
Experiment 1, it was the hardest rearrangement to make, but here its algorithm should be the easiest 
to formulate.  Second, children should be more likely to use proto-loops, i.e., the precursors to full-
fledged loops, in algorithms with a simple structure, such as a reversal as opposed to a reverse 
parity sort (prediction 3).  Third, children should spontaneously use gestures as they try to formulate 
algorithms (prediction 4).  Their gestures should make visible their mental simulations of moves, 
because the participants were not allowed to make actual moves of cars. 
Participants 
We tested twenty-four new children from the same population as before (age M = 10;1 
years, ranging from 9;6 to 10;6 years; 13 M and 11 F). 
Design 
The participants in the experiment had to describe in their own words how to make the four 
rearrangements of six cars, but they were not allowed to move the cars.  The complexity of the four 
algorithms should predict the difficulty of formulating them, and we measured the accuracy of the 
children’s algorithms and the times that they took to formulate them.  We also video-recorded the 
children’s performance.  Each participant carried out the task in one of the 24 possible orders 
allocated at random. 
Procedure 
There was an initial “warm up” phase in which the children tackled simple rearrangements 
of four cars in order to familiarize them with the railway environment. It was identical to the 
procedure in Experiment 1, with the goal displayed on a photograph behind the right track, and the 
children moved the cars to make the rearrangements.   For the experiment proper, the experimenter 
told the children that they had to describe in their own words how to make four rearrangements of 
six cars, i.e., to describe the moves needed to yield the train in its required order on the right track.  
The instructions also made clear that the participants could look at the railway track with the train 
on the left track, and the photograph of the goal on right track, but they were not allowed to move 
any of the cars.   
The transcriptions of the videos 
As in the previous experiments, the entire session was video-recorded, and transcribed to 
record the children’s descriptions of their algorithms, the overall times from the presentation of the 
goal to the end of each description of an algorithm, and the gestures that accompanied their 
descriptions of the algorithms.  Two independent judges coded the video-recordings in order to 
make explicit each algorithm.  The algorithm included all the moves described by the children 
either through a verbal description, a gesture, or both. Thus, for example, given the following initial 
arrangement of the wagons: 
abcdef [] - 
if the child pointed to all the wagons b, c, d, e and f , and drew in the air a trajectory from the left to 
the side track while saying “I move these here”, the judges transcribed the move as: 
 a[bcdef] - 
The two judges also identified the occurrence of proto-loops. Thus, for example, given the 
following arrangement of the wagons: 
 - [bcdef]a 
if the child said “I move b from the siding to the left track then to the right track, and the same with 
c, d, e and f”, the judges coded the description as a proto-loop. Table 3 is a translation from the 
Italian of a child’s protocol for a reversal. The table also presents the transcription of the protocol 
into notation, and includes the identification of a proto-loop. Examples of transcriptions for the 
other sorts of rearrangement are in Appendix B. The two judges agreed in their coding of the 
algorithms on 84% of trials (Cohen’s κ = .81, p < .0001); and a third independent judge, the first 
author, resolved the discrepancies prior to the statistical analyses. The two judges agreed on 88% of 
trials about the occurrence of a proto-loop in an algorithm (Cohen’s κ = .73, p < .0001), where a 
proto-loop is an abbreviation for the repetition of the same set of moves, e.g., “and then d and then e 
and then f”.  The third independent judge resolved the discrepancies between the two judges.  
In some algorithms, the children described an illegal move in which a car jumped over an 
intervening one, as in the move from: 
a[ce]bdf     
to: 
 ae[c]bdf 
Any algorithms describing such moves or for which the final train on the right track did not match 
the goal were scored as inaccurate. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Results and discussion 
We excluded from analysis the data from three participants because more than half of their 
descriptions included illegal moves or unclear descriptions of moves.  Table 4 summarizes the 
results from the remaining 21 participants: the number of correct algorithms, the number of proto-
loops they contained, and the mean times that the participants took to formulate their correct 
algorithms. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 Despite the slight anomaly of the palindrome – perhaps because it contains only three sorts 
of car (abc), theoretical complexity predicted the stochastic trend in accuracy of the children’s 
algorithms (Page’s L = 502, z = 4.24, p < .00003), and in their latencies (Page’s L = 228, z = 13.22, 
p < .000001).  In contrast, the minimal number of moves in making each rearrangement (see Table 
1 above) did not predict a reliable trend in accuracy (Page’s L = 462, z = 0.98, p > .16).  The use of 
proto-loops occurred mainly on reversals (prediction 3), and this bias reflected the simple nature of 
its loop of operations. The participants differed one from another in the accuracy of their algorithms 
(Friedman non-parametric analysis of variance, χ2 = 30.75, df = 3, p < .0001), and once again this 
difference correlated neither with age in months (Spearman ρ =  -.09, p > .69) nor with gender (63% 
for males and 50% for females; Mann-Whitney test, z = 1.55, p > .1, Cliff’s δ = .38). 
The children accompanied 99% of descriptions of moves with a gesture.  The exceptions 
were due to a child who described four moves without an accompanying gesture. This massive use 
of spontaneous gestures was striking.  Children used deictic gestures to point at cars, and iconic 
gestures through the air to indicate the movement of a car from its current location to one that they 
either described or left unsaid.  Most of these gestures were movements of a hand, but some were 
movements of the head, e.g., turning it in the direction described in the algorithm.  As the protocol 
in Table 3 illustrates, gestures often characterized a movement without the child describing its 
starting position or its destination.   We had not anticipated the extent to which the children gesture, 
and so the video-recordings were not always such that a fine-grained analysis of them was feasible.  
We remedied this problem in the next experiment. 
In sum, the experiment corroborated the model theory’s predictions: the theoretical 
complexity of the algorithms determined the difficulty of formulating them (prediction 2) and 
inversely the use of proto-loops (prediction 3), and the children’s gestures showed the moves that 
they were imagining (prediction 4). 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
The ubiquity of gestures strongly suggests that they are a consequence of children’s 
kinematic simulations.  They should allow children to finesse the description of cars or their moves 
(see Table 3).  They should also help children to keep in mind what cars are where on the railway 
track.  Hence, if children were unable to gesture, then they should be more likely to err in abducing 
algorithms (prediction 5).  Our final experiment tested this prediction.  The participants formulated 
algorithms to make the four rearrangements in two conditions, once when they were allowed to 
gesture, and once when they could not gesture because their hands were crossed inside a cloth muff. 
Participants 
We tested 34 new children from the same population as before (age M = 10;5 years, ranging 
from 9;10 to 11;5 years; 13 M and 21 F). 
Design 
The participants acted as their own controls for two experimental manipulations: the four 
different rearrangements, and whether or they could make gestures.  Hence, they formulated 
algorithms for the four rearrangements twice in two different blocks of trials: in one block they 
were allowed to gesture (gesture condition), and in one block they were prevented from gesturing 
(no-gesture condition).  The order of the two blocks was counterbalanced so that half the 
participants began with the gesture condition, and the other half began with the no-gesture 
condition.  The trains had different labels on the cars in the two blocks: in one block the labels were 
numbers and in one block they were letters, and the occurrence of the two sorts of labels in the 
gesture and no-gesture conditions was counterbalanced.  Within each block, the four 
rearrangements were presented in a random order to each child.   We video-recorded the 
experiment, and recorded the accuracy of the children’s algorithms, and their mean latencies for 
correct algorithms.  We also analyzed their gestures in the condition that allowed them to gesture. 
Procedure 
The participants were tested individually in a single session in a quiet room with the sole 
presence of the experimenter. The participants carried out a “warm up” in which they made 
rearrangements in order to familiarize themselves with the railway environment. In these problems, 
the initial state was: abcd[-] -, and the train had to be rearranged in four different orders: -[-]acdb; -
[-]bcda; -[-] adcb; and -[-]cdba. 
In the experiment proper, the gesture condition was identical to Experiment 2.  The children 
were presented with an arrangement of cars on the left track, and a photo of the required goal state 
behind the right track.   The experimenter told them that they had to explain in their own words how 
they would make the rearrangement, i.e., to describe the moves needed to yield the train in its 
required order on the right track.  They were not allowed to move the actual cars, but they were 
allowed to gesture in the gesture condition, though the experimenter did not prompt them to do so.   
The no-gesture condition was identical except that the children were prevented from gesturing 
because they had to wear a soft cloth muff with their arms crossed inside it. The experimenter 
introduced the no-gesture condition with the words:  “Before you start, please wear this muff to 
keep your arms crossed,” and she showed the child how to wear the muff.  Likewise, the 
experimenter told the participants when the gesture condition was second: “Now, you'll do the same 
task without the muff”, and the child took off the muff.  We video-recorded the experimental 
sessions, and transcribed them. 
The transcriptions and coding of the videos 
Two independent judges made transcriptions of the moves described by the children through 
both speech and gestures, following the same coding procedures used in Experiment 2. Examples of 
transcriptions for all four problems are in Appendix C.  The judges agreed in their coding of the 
accuracy of the algorithms on 95% of trials (Cohen’s κ = .925, p < .0001), they agreed about the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of proto-loops in the algorithms on 93% of trials (Cohen’s κ = .73, p 
< .0001).   A second pair of judges viewed the videos of the children’s gestures three times.  First, 
they judged whether or not the children’s descriptions of moves were accompanied by a gesture, 
and whether or not it corresponded to the description.  They agreed on 89% of instances (Cohen’s κ 
= .73, p < .0001).  Second, they judged whether each child’s gestures accompanying a move were 
deictic, iconic, or both, where any movement of the hands, the head, or the shoulder, counted as a 
gesture.  They agreed about the occurrence of deictic gestures on 94% of instances (Cohen’s κ = 
.81, p < .0001) and about iconic gestures on 98% of instances (Cohen’s κ = .92, p < .0001).  Third, 
they judged whether deictic gestures accompanied full descriptions of their referent (e.g., “ I take 
b”) or not (e.g., “I take this”).  Likewise, they judged whether iconic gestures accompanied 
descriptions of the starting point, the end point, both points, or neither point.  For all of these 
evaluations, a third independent judge (the first author) resolved the discrepancies prior to analyses.  
Finally, two different judges counted the ratios of deictic gestures and iconic gestures to the number 
of moves that the children described in their correct algorithms. They then reached agreement about 
any discrepancies in their judgments (Kendall’s tau: .80 and .71, for deictic and iconic gestures, 
respectively, p < .0001 in both cases). 
 
Results and discussion 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 We analyzed the results for 32 participants, excluding those for two participants whose 
descriptions of algorithms were too unclear to categorize as correct or incorrect.  Table 5 
summarizes the percentages of correct algorithms, and their mean latencies (in s) in the gesture and 
no-gesture conditions.  The children formulated correct algorithms more often when they could 
gesture (65%) than when they could not (52%; Wilcoxon test, z = 2.37, p < .01, Cliff’s δ = .23).  
Likewise, the mean times that the children took to create correct algorithms were faster when they 
could gesture (40 s) than when they could not (44 s; Wilcoxon test, z = 2.37, p = .02, Cliff’s δ = 
.17).  The effects of gesturing therefore corroborated the model theory’s prediction (5).  Overall, 
performance did not differ reliably between the two groups used to control the order of blocks in 
either accuracy (Mann-Whitney test, z = .96, p = .34, Cliff’s δ = .19) or in response times (Mann-
Whitney test, z = 1.06, p = .29, Cliff’s δ = .23).  But, there were reliable effects of the order of the 
two blocks: the children were more accurate (Mann-Whitney test, z = 2.35, p< .02, Cliff’s δ = .46) 
and faster (Mann-Whitney, z = 2.46, p < .015, Cliff’s δ = .55) in the no gesture condition if they had 
already carried out the gesture condition than if they had not (see Table 5).  The advantage of 
gestures carried over to a small but reliable degree to the no gesture condition. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 Table 6 presents the percentages of correct algorithms for the four sorts of rearrangement 
both in the gesture and in the no gesture conditions, the numbers of proto-loops they contained, and 
the mean times to formulate them accurately.  Despite the unexpectedly good performance on the 
reverse parity sort, the theoretical complexity of the algorithms predicted the rank-order decline in 
their accuracy over the four sorts of rearrangement (Page’s L = 785.5, z = 3.89, p < .0001) and the 
increasing trend in the overall times to formulate correct algorithms (Page’s L = 199.5, z = 3.21, p < 
.001), though this trend was marginal in the no-gesture condition (L = 135, z = 1.55, p = .06).  These 
trends corroborated the model theory (prediction 2).  But, as the theory predicts, the minimal 
numbers of moves required for making the rearrangements did not account for the difficulty of 
formulating accurate algorithms (Page’s L = 711.5, z = .868, p > .15).  Proto-loops occurred in 38 of 
the 256 algorithms (18%), equally distributed between the gesture and no-gesture conditions.  But, 
as in the previous experiment, they tended to occur in reversals (see Table 6), the algorithm with the 
lowest complexity (prediction 3).   
On 74% of their descriptions of moves, the 32 children made gestures, which always 
corresponded to the move, and on 26% of the descriptions of moves, they made no gestures. 
Six children failed to describe any algorithm correctly, and of the remainder, two made no gestures 
whatsoever. The remaining 24 children all made more gestures corresponding to a move than not 
(Binomial p = 0.524).  For these 24 children, Table 7 presents the percentages of descriptions of 
moves for the four sorts of problem that the children accompanied with gestures (in the gesture 
condition), and the mean ratios of number of gestures to number of described moves for deictic 
gestures, iconic gestures, and both sorts of gesture overall.  Such a ratio is necessary because the 
numbers of moves to be described differs over the four sorts of problem.   Although the trend in the 
percentages of gestures increases with the theoretical complexity of the algorithms, it is not possible 
to test its reliability because only four participants formulated accurate algorithms for all four 
problems.  However, one notable observation pertaining to these data is the proportions of problems 
in which children accompanied every one of their descriptions of a move with a gesture (69%) as 
opposed to accompanying only some of their descriptions of a move with a gesture (31%).  Of these 
24 children, most of them (16) described more algorithms with gestures for each move than not (7 
children), and there as one tie (Binomial p < .05).  Salient exceptions were descriptions containing 
proto-loops, where the children glossed over descriptions of moves of specific cars (only 51% of 
algorithms for reversal were described with gestures accompanying every move).   
Insert Table 7 about here 
The children in the present experiment accompanied 74% of their descriptions of moves 
with gestures, whereas those in the previous experiment accompanied 99% of descriptions of moves 
with gestures.  The reason could be that preventing children from gesturing in the first block had a 
residual effect on the number of moves that they accompanied with gestures in the second block.  It 
was only 60% whereas when the gesture condition occurred first, it was 85%.    The difference, 
however, was not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test, z = 1.14, p = .255, Cliff’s δ =0.17). 
To examine the relation between gestures and descriptions of moves, we were forced to drop 
a further participant from the analysis because this child’s descriptions were often unclear.  The 
remaining 23 children accompanied their deictic gestures with complete description of the referents 
(85%) more often than not (15%, Wilcoxon test, z = 3.87, p < .0001, Cliff’s δ =0.92), but they 
accompanied their iconic gestures with no verbal descriptions of the moves (74%) more often than 
they accompanied them with an incomplete verbal description of the move (21%: z = 2.81, p < .005, 
Cliff’s δ = 0.61), or a complete verbal description of the move (5%:  z = 3.52, p < .0001, Cliff’s δ 
=0.76). 
 Finally, the pattern of individual differences was much the same as before.  The participants 
differed reliably in their ability to formulate accurate algorithms (Friedman non-parametric analysis 
of variance: χ2 = 28.319, df = 3, p < .0001).  The only difference from previous studies was that the 
males (a mean of 5.5 accurate algorithms out of 8) were reliably better than the females (a mean of 
4.1 accurate algorithms; Mann-Whitney test, z = 2.058, p < .05, Cliff’s δ = .43), and the effect was 
much the same whether or not the participants were able to gesture.  The children differed reliably 
neither in using full descriptions with deictic gestures (Friedman non-parametric analysis of 
variance, χ2 = 3, df = 3, p > .38) nor in using incomplete descriptions with their iconic gestures 
(Friedman non-parametric analysis of variance, χ2 = 1, df = 3, p > .80). 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The two most striking findings of our investigation are that children as young as ten can 
abduce algorithms to make rearrangements, and that their gestures help them to formulate accurate 
algorithms. The task presupposes the ability to make rearrangements, and ten year-olds are able to 
do so.  For instance, given a train of six cars on the left track, abcdef, and the goal of rearranging 
them into the order acebdf on the right track, i.e., a parity sort, all the children in Experiment 1 
made the rearrangement.  Our computer program mAbducer represents the starting state of the 
rearrangement as follows: 
 abcdef[-] - 
where the left side of the string represents the order of the cars on the left track, the square brackets 
represent the contents of the siding, “-” denotes an empty part of the track, and the right side of the 
string represents the right track.  The program uses a means-ends analysis to make the 
rearrangement in a minimal number of seven moves of ten cars: 
abcde[-]f   abcd [e]f   abc[e]df   ab[ce]df   a[ce]bdf   ace[-]bdf   - [-]acebdf 
The program’s means-ends analysis uses successive parts of the ends, i.e., it solves for one or more 
cars in the goal at a time (for mAbducer’s algorithm for making rearrangements, see the earlier 
section on the model theory). The children were able to use a similar procedure for making 
rearrangements, and the program’s minimal numbers of moves predicted the children’s difficulty 
with the task, as measured in the actual numbers of moves that the they took – they were seldom 
parsimonious – and in the times that it took (prediction 1 in our earlier summary of the predictions).  
Hence, as Experiment 1 showed, a palindrome was easier than a parity sort, which was easier than a 
reverse parity sort, and a reversal of the train was hardest of all.  Adults yielded the same trend in 
difficulty in making these rearrangements (Khemlani et al., 2013). 
 A subtle difference exists between a rearrangement and an algorithm for a rearrangement.  
When individuals rearrange cars, their moves are constrained by the goal –  the required order 
shown in the picture behind the right track.  When they formulate an algorithm to make a particular 
rearrangement, such as a reversal of the order of the cars in a train, they use the goal to simulate the 
moves.  But, the resulting algorithm itself cannot be under the control of the goal.  Programmers can 
see the goal, but the program that they are constructing cannot.  Hence, for example, an algorithm to 
reverse the order of cars in a train can be described in these terms: 
1) Move all but one car on the left track to the siding. 
2) While there are cars on the siding, move one car from the left track to the right track, and move 
one car from the siding to the left track.  
3) Otherwise, move one car from the left track to the right track. 
When this algorithm is applied to the train: abcdef[-] -, the result is the reversal: - [-]fedcba.  The 
algorithm therefore does not use the goal to make the rearrangement; in effect, it constructs the 
goal.   
The task of formulating an algorithm calls for a kinematic simulation of a sequence of 
moves that the cars have to make, and then for its conversion into a description.  The claim 
certainly applies to Experiments 2 and 3, because the children were not allowed to move the cars.  
The difficulty of this task should depend, not on the number of moves that occur in executing the 
algorithm, but rather on the complexity of the algorithm itself – a factor that has no evident effect 
on making rearrangements. Complexity can be assessed in many ways. But, both an intuitive 
analysis of the structure of the four algorithms for our rearrangements (see the section on the 
model theory) and their Kolmogorov complexity yield the same predicted trend.  As a 
consequence, the reversal of a train, which is the hardest rearrangement to make (Experiment 1), 
is the easiest algorithm to formulate because its structure is so transparent (Experiment 2).  It 
repeats a loop of two moves four times. The palindrome has a structure that should be less easy to 
grasp, because its loop of two moves is repeated only twice.  The parity sort, which calls for a 
train to be rearranged so that all cars in odd-numbered positions precede those in even-numbered 
positions, should be still harder to grasp, because after such a loop it adds a sequence of three 
moves.  And the reverse parity sort, which is the converse of the parity sort, should be the most 
difficult of the four, because its structure is so complicated.  At first, it appears not to contain a 
loop at all, but in fact it does have one, albeit one of four moves. 
Experiment 2 showed that ten-year-olds were able to formulate algorithms.  They could do 
so even though they were not allowed to move the cars. They had to take the goal into account in 
formulating an algorithm, but the algorithms they created did not refer to them, but aimed instead to 
produce the required rearrangement. The accuracy of the children’s algorithms followed their 
predicted complexity (prediction 2), and their use of proto-loops – abbreviations of moves in a way 
that is a precursor to proper loops – also corroborated the theoretical complexity of the algorithms 
(prediction 3).  Nearly all the proto-loops occurred in formulations of the algorithm with the least 
complex structure, i.e., the reversal. To abduce algorithms, the children had to make mental 
simulations of sequences of moves, which became overt in their many gestures – deictic ones that 
picked out particular cars and iconic ones that mimicked the moves of one or more cars (prediction 
4).  The gestures were indeed an outward sign of inward kinematic simulations.  In sum, the 
theoretical complexity of an algorithm predicted both the accuracy and the time it took to formulate 
in both Experiments 2 and 3. 
Most, but not all, of the children made gestures in formulating algorithms, and they did so in 
describing about three-quarters of the moves in their algorithms in Experiment 3.  Every single 
gesture corresponded to a corresponding move in the algorithm.   Gestures that accompany speech 
appear to serve several purposes, and there are three main views about them (see the Introduction).  
First, gestures could be epiphenomena that play no causal role in cognition, but that merely spill 
over from thinking into acting, perhaps because individuals encounter difficulties during speech 
production (see, e.g., Kita & Ozyurek, 2003; Melinger & Kita, 2007).  Second, they could be 
designed, perhaps unconsciously, to help listeners to understand what the speaker is saying (e.g., 
Hostetter, 2011).  Third, gestures could be aids to thinking and especially to mental simulations 
(e.g., Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001; Wagner et al., 2004; Hostetter & Alibali, 2010). Within our 
theory, gestures reflect mental simulations but they also causal effects. In the case of ten-year-olds, 
who have limited cognitive resources, gestures should aid them in formulating algorithms.  They 
should help, because they reduce the demand to describe actions, and because they aid children in 
keeping track of what cars are where in the current juncture of the simulation (see Marghetis & 
Benjamin, 2014). 
Experiment 3 bore out the causal role of gestures in mental simulations.  When children 
were unable to gesture, their ability to formulate accurate algorithms fell by 13% in accuracy 
(prediction 5).  So, children can create algorithms without using gestures, but in this case the task is 
more demanding, and accordingly they are slightly more likely to err.  A further result was that their 
gestures did not slow children down reliably, so they can gesture without taxing mental resources, 
again a corroboration of their use of mental simulations in order to formulate algorithms. This result 
contrasts with the findings of Wagner et al. (2004), who observed that participants’ inhibiting 
gestures itself adds to the load on working memory, and impairs college students’ ability to solve 
math problems. For the no-gesture condition of their experiment, however, they instructed their 
participants to keep as still as possible.  To carry out this instruction may in itself add to the 
cognitive load of the task.  In contrast, the children in our study did not have to concentrate on not 
making gestures, because they were physically prevented from gesturing – they wore a muff that 
kept their arms crossed.  They formulated algorithms faster and more accurately when they could 
gesture than when they could not.  As our theory postulates, when simulations control gestures, they 
reduce the load on working memory, because they reduce the demands of the task (see also Trafton 
et al., 2006).  It is no longer necessary to describe movements, because iconic gestures 
communicate them, and likewise the gestures help them to keep track of the positions of cars. 
Of course, there are potential alternative explanations.  One hypothesis is that gestures are 
more a consequence of the process of description than in carrying out a mental simulation.  
According to the “information packaging hypothesis,” gestures underlie the conceptual planning of 
speech (Alibali, Kita & Young, 2000).  These investigators showed that the gestures of five-year-
old children differ depending on whether they are describing differences in quantities in 
conservation tasks or explaining these differences.   They concluded that gestures relate to 
conceptual plans rather than the generation of the surface forms of sentences.  One interpretation of 
our results is that gestures reflect still deeper processes of thinking prior to description (see 
McNeill, 1992, p. 245).  This claim is borne out by our finding that when children gesture, they 
abbreviate their descriptions of moves.  They say nothing about a particular move but merely refer 
to it with an iconic gesture. 
 A more radical alternative is that gestures have no effect on formulating algorithms, but that 
preventing children from gesturing distracts or inhibits them in some way and so they are less 
accurate than normal in formulating algorithms.  The first part of this alternative is easy to refute.  
Children spontaneously gestured in Experiments 2 and 3, and so it is unlikely that they would do so 
if gestures had no effect on formulating algorithms.  Moreover, gestures in Experiment 3 had a 
manifest effect on their algorithms: iconic gestures tended to replace explicit descriptions of moves.  
The second part of this alternative hypothesis is slightly harder to refute.  Whenever two conditions 
yield differences in accuracy, it can be unclear whether one condition is improving performance, or 
the other condition is impairing performance, or both.  One datum, however, is that children were 
more accurate and faster in the no gesture condition of Experiment 3 if they had already carried out 
the gesture condition than if they had not.  A plausible explanation is that the beneficial effects of 
gesturing carried over into the trials in which the children couldn’t gesture.  Perhaps the children 
made covert gestures of a sort that we couldn’t observe on video recordings.  However the effect 
was mediated, it presupposes that gesturing was helpful to the children.   
One final alternative hypothesis, which we owe to a reviewer, is that gestures might lead 
children to adopt a more reflective stance in which they review their own reasoning.  However, 
there are grounds for skepticism about this possibility.  Such reflections should lead to slower 
responses, but in fact children were faster to formulate correct algorithms in Experiment 3 when 
they could gesture.  Moreover, the gestures accompanied the children’s descriptions of the moves in 
the algorithm, which suggests that the simulations yield both gestures and descriptions at the same 
time.  The children were making both sorts of response in real time rather than reflecting off-line on 
the correctness of their performance. 
 The limits of our studies are pertinent to these alternative hypotheses.  One limit is that our 
method of preventing gestures in Experiment 3 was obvious to the children.  This knowledge in turn 
may have affected their performance.  Hence, it is conceivable that a more natural method of 
preventing gestures could have a less deleterious effect on performance.  Adults appear to gesture 
less than children in the algorithmic task, but it may be that their eye movements play an analogous 
role to children’s gestures.  We are currently investigating this hypothesis.  Another limit is that the 
use of a muff to prevent children from gesturing with their hands did not prevent them from moving 
their heads, shoulders, or eyes, in ways that were impossible to detect on the video-recordings.  
Perhaps the prevention of such moves would impair performance even more. 
 In all our studies, both the present experiments with children and the earlier experiments 
with adults (Khemlani et al., 2013), the participants have differed from one another in their ability 
to formulate algorithms.  This difference does not appear to depend on age or on gender.  Verbal 
abilities as well as processing capacity of working memory could be factors yielding these 
differences (cf. Kane, Conway, Hambrick, & Engle, 2007). Computer scientists often complain that 
no reliable and valid test exists that predicts the likelihood that naïve individuals – those who know 
nothing of programming – can become competent programmers (see, e.g., Bornat, Dehnadi, & 
Dennis, 2008).  Perhaps performance in formulating informal algorithms in the railway domain 
predicts this ability. 
In conclusion, children are able to make rearrangements and to formulate algorithms for 
making them. The minimal number of moves for a rearrangement predicts its difficulty for adults 
and for children.  In contrast, the complexity of algorithms predicts the difficulty in abducing them 
for adults and for children.  Children’s mental simulations become manifest in the gestures that they 
make when they are not allowed to move the actual cars on the railway track.  These gestures in 
turn help them to abduce algorithms, most likely because gestures reduce both the demand to 
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Appendix A.  mAbducer’s minimal solutions to the four rearrangements in the experiments.  
To make rearrangements, mAbducer constructs a kinematic sequence of models containing 
the smallest number of moves.   It represents the railway environment as follows: 
a[bcdef]  
where a is on left track, bcdef are on the siding demarcated by the square brackets, and the right 
track is empty. (For simplicity, we have dropped the use of “-” to represent an empty part of the 
track in this appendix.)  Trains can be rearranged using three sorts of move: 
S: move one or more cars from left track to siding,  
R: move one or more cars from left track to right track,  
L: move one or more cars from the siding to left track.   
The number following each of these abbreviations in the solutions below denotes the number of 
cars in the move.   mAbducer yields the following minimal solutions. 
1. Reversal: abcdef[ ]  is to be rearranged as:  [ ]fedcba.  
The program yields the solution: 
S 5:  a [bcdef] 
R 1:    [bcdef]a 
L 1:  b[cdef]a 
R 1:    [cdef]ba 
L 1:  c [def]ba 
R 1:    [def]cba 
L 1:  d[ef]cba 
R 1:    [ef]dcba 
L 1:  e [f]dcba 
R 1:    [f]edcba 
L 1:  f [ ]edcba 
R 1:    [ ]fedcba 
The total number of moves is 12, and the number of cars moved is16.  The sequence contains four 
iterations of a loop of two moves: R 1 and L 1. 
2. Palindrome: abccba[ ]  to be rearranged as:   [ ]aabbcc.   
The program yields the solution: 
S 2: abcc[ba] 
R 2: ab[ba]cc 
L 1: abb[a]cc 
R 2: a[a]bbcc 
L 1: aa[ ]bbcc 
R 2:    [ ]aabbcc 
The number of moves is 6, and the number of cars to be moved is 10.  The sequence has an initial 
move, two iterations of a loop of two moves, and then a final move.    
3. Parity sort:  abcdef[ ] is to be rearranged as:  [ ]acebdf.   
The program yields the solution: 
R 1: abcde[ ]f 
S 1: abcd [e]f 
R 1: abc[e]df 
S 1: ab[ce]df 
R 1: a[ce]bdf 
L 2: ace[ ]bdf 
R 3:   [ ]acebdf 
The number of moves is 7, and the number of cars to be moved is 10.  The sequence has two 
iterations of a loop of two moves, but then a complex sequence of three moves.     
4. Reverse parity sort:  acebdf[ ]  is to be rearranged as:  [ ]abcdef.   
The program yields the solution: 
R 1: acebd[ ]f 
S 2: ace[bd]f 
R 1: ac[bd]ef 
L 2: acbd[ ]ef 
R 1: acb[ ]def 
S 1: ac[b]def 
R 1: a[b]cdef 
L 1: ab[ ]cdef 
R 2: [ ]abcdef 
The number of moves is 9, and the number of cars moved is 12.  The sequence contains two 
iterations of a complex loop of four moves. 
  
Appendix B.  The translations from Italian of three descriptions from three participants in 
Experiment 2 of how to make palindromes, parity sorts and reverse parity sorts and their relative 
transcriptions using mAbducer’s notation.  
 
Participant’s 10 description of how to make a palindrome. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
abccba[] has to be rearranged as: []aabbcc. 
Child: “I would put this (points to a) there (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the 
side track).” 
Transcription: abccba[]  abccb[a]  
Child: “I would put b (points to b) there (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the side 
track).” 
Transcription: abbcc[ba] 
Child: “I would put these two cars (points to the two c) here (draws in the air a trajectory from the 
left track to the right track).” 
Transcription: ab[ba]cc  
Child: “Then I would move b (points to side track and draws in the air a trajectory from the side 
track to left track) and these two are attached (points to the two b).” 
Transcription:  abb[a]cc 
Child: “Then, a is here (points to side track), I move b and b ahead (draws in the air a trajectory 
from the left track to the right track).” 
Transcription: a[a]bbcc 
Child: “Then I move a backwards (makes a movement with the right hand so to grasp a car on the 
side track and draws in the air a trajectory from the side track to the left track).” 
Transcription: aa[]bbcc 
Child: “Thus these two are equal (points to one of the a) and I put them ahead (draws in the air a 





Participant’s 3 description of how to make a parity sort. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
abcdef[] has to be rearranged as: []acebdf. 
Child: “I’d make move this (points to f) there (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the 
right track).” 
Transcription: abcdef [] abcde[]f 
Child: “Then this (points to e) here (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the side 
track).” 
Transcription: abcd[e]f 
Child: “This (points to d) ahead (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the right track).” 
Transcription: abc[e]df 
Child: “I’d move this (points to c) here (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the side 
track).” 
Transcription: ab[ce]df 
Child: “This (points to b) here (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the right track).” 
Transcription: a[ce]bdf 
Child: “I make go back (draws in the air a trajectory from the side track to the left track) c and e 
(points to c and e).” 
Transcription: ace[]bdf 
Child: “Then I make go ahead e (makes a grasp movement with the right hand as to grasp a car on 
the left track and draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the right track).” 
Transcription:  ac[]ebdf 
Child: “I make go back c (makes a grasp movement with the right hand as to grasp a car on the left 
track and draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the right track).” 
Transcription:  a[]cebdf 
Child: “Then a (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the right track).”  





Participant’s 25 description of how to make a reverse parity sort. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
acebdf[] has to be rearranged as: []abcdef. 
Child: “I make f (points to f) go first (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the right 
track).” 
Transcription: acebdf [] acebd[]f 
Child: “Then we take d and b (points to d and b) and put them here (draws in the air a trajectory 
from the left track to the side track).” 
Transcription: ace[bd]f 
Child: “The e (points to e) there (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the right track).” 
Transcription: ac[bd]ef 
Child: “Then I make b (points to side track) go back (draws in the air a trajectory from the side 
track to the left track).” 
Transcription: acb[d]ef 
Child: “We take d (draws in the air a trajectory from the side track to the right track).” 
Transcription: acbd[]ef 
Child: “I take d (points to d) and put it there (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the 
side track).” 
Transcription: acb[]def 
Child: “We put b (points to b) here again (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the side 
track).” 
Transcription: ac[b]def 
Child: “We put c (points to c) after d (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the right 
track).” 
Transcription:  a[b]cdef 
Child: “Then we take again the b (makes with the right hand a grasp movement as to take a car) 
and put it behind the c (draws in the air a clock-wise trajectory from the side track to the right 
track).” 
Transcription: ab[]cdef, a []bcdef 
Child: “And we put the a (points to a) behind the b (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track 





Appendix C.  The translations from Italian of four descriptions from four participants in 
Experiment 3 of how to make reversal, palindromes, parity sorts and reverse parity sorts and 
relative transcriptions using mAbducer’s notation, and the identification of proto-loops.  
 
Participant’s 5 description of how to make a reversal. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
abcdef[] has to be rearranged as: []fedcba. 
Child: “I move all here (open the five fingers of the right hand and draws in the air a small 
trajectory from the left track to the right track).” 
Transcription: abcdef [] [abcdef] 
Child: “Then I put a here (draws in the air a trajectory from the side track to the left track)” 
Transcription: a[bcdef] 
Child: “then here (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the right track).” 
Transcription: [bcdef]a   
Child: “b then here (draws in the air a trajectory from the side track to the left track)” 
Transcription  b[cdef]a   
Child: “then there (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the right track).” 
Transcription: [cdef]ba   
Child: “The c (makes a little clock-wise arc in the air from the side track to the left then to the right 
track).” 
Transcription: c[def]ba   [def]cba   
Child: “until the f the same”. The assertion is a proto-loop, because the utterance refers to a 
repetition of two moves, and cannot be interpreted correctly out of context:- 




Participant’s 11 description of how to make a palindrome. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
abccba[] has to be rearranged as: []aabbcc. 
Child: “I move a and b (points to a and b) to the side track (draws in the air a trajectory from the 
left track to the side track).” 
Transcription: abccba[] abcc[ba]  
Child: “The two c (points to the two c with two fingers) ahead (draws in the air a trajectory from 
the left track to the right track).” 
Transcription: ab[ba]cc 
Child: “I leave a there (points to the side track) and I move b back (points to the side track and 
draws in the air a trajectory from the side track to the left track)” 
Transcription: abb[a]cc  
Child: “and I move the two b in the right track (points to left track and draws in the air a trajectory 
from the left track to right track).” 
Transcription  a[a]bbcc 
Child: “I take the a on the side track and put it near the a on the left track (draws in the air a 
trajectory from the side track to the left track).” 
Transcription: aa[]bbcc 






Participant’s 31 description of how to make a parity sort. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
abcdef[] has to be rearranged as: []acebdf. 
Child: “I put f (points to f) ahead (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the right 
track).” 
Transcription: abcde f[] abcde[]f 
Child: “I move e on the side track (points to e and draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to 
the side track).” 
Transcription: abcd[e]f 
Child: “I move d ahead (points to d and draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the right 
track).” 
Transcription: abc[e]df 
Child: “Then the c where is the e (points to left track and draws in the air a trajectory from the left 
track to side track).” 
Transcription: ab[ce]df 
Child: “I move ahead b (points to b and draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the right 
track).” 
Transcription: a[ce]bdf 
Child: “Then you make go backwards those that were on the side track (points to the side track and 
draws in the air a trajectory from the side track to the left track).” 
Transcription: ace[]bdf 
Child: “You make them go ahead together (points to the left track and draws in the air a trajectory 
from the left track to the right track).” 
Transcription:  a[]cebdf 
Child: “Then you pass the a (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the right track).” 




Participant’s 32 description of how to make a reverse parity sort. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
acebdf[] has to be rearranged as: []abcdef. 
Child: “I put f (points to f) there (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the right track).” 
Transcription: acebdf [] acebd[]f 
Child: “I move these two (points to b and d) there (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track 
to the side track).” 
Transcription: ace[bd]f 
Child: “I send e ahead (points to e and draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the right 
track).” 
Transcription: ac[bd]ef 
Child: “These two (points to b and d) are still here (points to side track) then I… yes I move 
backwards both (points to the side track and draws in the air a trajectory from the side track to the 
left track) the b and the d” 
Transcription: acbd[]ef 
Chil: “and I make move only the d (draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the right 
track).” 
Transcription: acb[]def 
Child: “Then I move again ahead b (points to b and draws in the air a trajectory from the left track 
to the side track).” 
Transcription: ac[b]def 
Child: “Then I make move c (points to c and draws in the air a trajectory from the left track to the 
right track).” 
Transcription: a[b]cdef 
Child: “Then I make go back again b (points to side track and draws in the air a trajectory from the 
side track to the left track)” 
Transcription:  ab[]cdef 
Child: “and I make go ahead a and b (points to a and b) directly (draws in the air a trajectory from 






Table 1. The four rearrangements used in the experiments, their minimal number of moves and 







 Initial state Goal state Number of 
moves 
Number of cars 
to be moved 
Palindrome abccba aabbcc 6 10 
Parity sort abcdef acebdf 7 10 
Reverse parity sort acebdf abcdef 9 12 
Reversal abcdef fedcba 12 16 
Table 2. The percentages of accurate rearrangements in Experiment 1, the mean number of moves, 












































Table 3. The translation from Italian of a participant’s (P 4) description in Experiment 2 of how to 
make a reversal, its transcription using mAbducer’s diagrams, and the identification of a proto-loop.  
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Task: abcdef has to be rearranged as: fedcba. 
Child: “I’d make move these (points from b to f) to the siding (draws in the air a trajectory from the 
left track to the right track).” 
Transcription: abcdef [] a[bcdef] 
Child: “Then I make a run and go there (draws in the air a trajectory from a to the right track).” 
Transcription: [bcdef]a   
Child: “Then I take off b (points to b and makes a little clock-wise arc in the air).” 
Transcription: b[cdef]a   
Child: “and I put it there (draws in the air a trajectory from b to the right track).” 
Transcription:  [cdef]ba   
Child: “Then the c (points to c and makes a little clock-wise arc in the air).” 
Transcription: c[def]ba   
Child: “and I put it there (draws in the air a trajectory from c to the right track).” 
Transcription: [def]cba   
Child: “Then the d (points to d and makes a little clock-wise arc in the air) 
Transcription: d[ef]cba   
Child: “and I put it there” (draws in the air a trajectory from d to the right track) 
Transcription: [ef]dcba   
Child: “Then the e (points to e, makes a little clock-wise arc in the air, and then draws in the air a 
trajectory from e to the right track).” The assertion is a proto-loop, because the utterance refers to a 
repetition of two moves, and cannot be interpreted correctly out of context:- 
Transcription: e[f]dcba [f]edcba   
Child: “Then the f (points to f and makes a little clock-wise arc in the air then draws in the air a 
trajectory from f to the right track).”   The proto-loop continues. 
Transcription: f[]edcba   []fedcba 
 
  
Table 4. The total numbers of correct algorithms in Experiment 2 (N = 21) depending on their 
predicted complexity, the total number of proto-loops they contained, and the mean times (s) that 




 The four rearrangements in the predicted order of their 
increasing complexity 
 Reversal Palindrome Parity sort Reverse 
parity sort 
Total numbers of correct                    
algorithms (N = 21) 
17 19 9 3 
Total number of correct 
algorithms with a proto-
loop (N = 21) 
8 1 3 1 











Table 5. The overall percentages of correct algorithms in Experiment 3 (N = 32) and the mean times 
(in s) to produce them in the gesture and no gesture conditions, depending on the order of these two 







 Gestures in first block 
 
Gestures in second block 
 Gestures No gestures Gestures No gestures 
Percent correct 
algorithms 
67 56 63 48 











Table 6. The percentages of correct algorithms in Experiment 3 (N = 32) for each of the four sorts 
of rearrangement, the total numbers of proto-loops in them, and the mean times (s) that the 







 The four rearrangements in the order of their theoretical complexity 




84 78 38 59 
Percent correct: 
No gestures 
78 66 31 34 
Number of proto- 
loops: Gestures 
18 0 1 0 
Number of proto- 
loops: No gestures 
17 2 0 0 




















Table 7. The percentages of descriptions of moves in Experiment 3 (N = 24) for the four sorts of 
problem that the children accompanied with gestures (in the gesture condition), and the mean ratios 
of number of gestures to number of described moves for deictic gestures, iconic gestures, and 
overall gestures. 
  
                                       Reversal       Palindrome       Parity sort       Reverse parity sort 
Percentages of moves 
accompanied with                       64               85                        81                      95 
gestures 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Mean ratios of      Deictic       .32                .42                       .41                    .41 
gestures to             Iconic        .49               .73                       .58                    .61 




Legend to Figure 
 
Figure 1.  The railway with the cars in an initial arrangement on the left track, the empty 
siding, the empty right track, and a picture behind the track of the rearrangement required on 
right track.  
 
 
 
 
 
